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Abstract
We study how rm-specic complementary assets and intellectual property rights
a¤ect the management of knowledge workers. The main results show when a rm
will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the e¤ects of comple-
mentary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that rms protected
weakly by complementary assets must sue leaving workers in order to obtain posi-
tive prots. Moreover, rms with more complementary assets pay higher wages and
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rmsproperty rights protection
reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative.
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1 Introduction
Knowledge workers make up a signicant proportion of advanced economiesworkforces.1
Their expertise is important for countless organizations around the world, but still we
have limited insight into how rms manage such workers. The available evidence suggests
that rms use two main instruments to incentivize and retain knowledge workers: wage
and litigation policies. For example, Fisk (2001) gives a fascinating historical account of
how Du Pont, the explosives/chemistry company, used wage policy to make workers stay
and aggressive litigation against workers who left to protect knowledge that was vital to
the company.
This paper studies the management of knowledge workers in an environment where
remuneration contracts are incomplete and worker initiative stems from the possibility
of leaving the employer carrying valuable ideas. Our analysis addresses two questions.
When will the rm take legal action and sue departing knowledge workers? And how do
rm-specic complementary assets and property rights protection determine a rms wage
policy vis-a-vis knowledge workers? The existing literature examines how complementary
assets can prevent competitors from expropriating a rms intellectual property.2 We
study how such assets can be used in combination with wage and suing policies to prevent
employees from leaving with valuable ideas.
The crux of the paper is twofold. First, regarding suing policy, a worker that expects
the rm to sue has weaker incentives to exert e¤ort, because the fraction of the surplus that
is accrued by a leaving worker decreases. The rms litigation policy therefore balances
the costs of having less motivated workers with the benets of fewer workers departing.
We nd that a rm protected strongly by formal property rights may not sue departing
workers. The reason is that suing would then be a "too powerful" instrument and ruin
worker initiative. In contrast, we nd that a rm not protected by complementary assets
must sue in order to achieve positive prots. The intuition is that if the rm does not
have complementary assets, not suing will lead to adverse selection, where only workers
1Some estimates are as high as 2530 percent. See the January 2006 survey of the Economist, Roberts
(2004), or Neef (1999) for evidence on the importance of knowledge workers.
2See the seminal contributions of Manseld (1986) and Teece (1986) on how rm-specic complemen-
tarities can protect intellectual property in the absence of legal protection.
2
with low-value ideas stay on in the rm. Second, regarding wage policy, we argue that
rms with more complementary assets should pay higher wages but will consequently
experience less worker initiative. The intuition is that a rm with more complementary
assets has a higher marginal value from workers staying on, and will therefore pay higher
wages in order to keep more workers. However, such higher pay will serve as a cushion
that weakens worker initiative.
In the model, rms are exposed both to moral hazard, in that workers exert unobserv-
able e¤ort to generate ideas, and to adverse selection, in that workers observe their ideas
privately. After a worker has generated an idea, whose value is private information to the
worker, the rm o¤ers a continuation wage that the worker may accept and stay on in the
rm, or reject and start up his own business based on the idea. If the worker starts up a
business, the rm may litigate against the worker. Complementary assets inside the rm
play a role in determining how valuable the idea is to the rm. The legal environment
plays a role in determining how likely it is that the rm will win a case against the worker.
In our benchmark analysis, the complete contract case, the use of complementary
assets is contractible, and the worker can be rewarded based on the prot generated by
the idea. We show that such complete contracts imply that the rm-specic assets are
always used e¢ ciently, worker e¤ort is high, and the worker never leaves the rm.
In our main analysis we deviate from the benchmark by assuming that the use of
rm-specic complementary assets is noncontractible. The incomplete contracts case
is realistic because of the ex-ante costs associated with writing complete contracts on
contingent use of complementary assets (Williamson, 1975) and the ex-post di¢ culties
in verifying the value of the idea when rm-specic assets have been used (Aghion and
Tirole, 1994). Noncontractibility in the use of complementary assets implies that prot
sharing between the worker and the rm is not feasible, and that the rm can only o¤er
a xed-wage contract to the worker.
We explore the incomplete-contract case in two directions. First, we investigate wage
and litigation policies when the rm cannot commit to wage and litigation policies at the
time the worker is hired. We imagine a rm that has not established a reputation for how
it will act when workers leave with ideas and for how it will reward workers developing
new ideas. A reputation for rewarding ideas and not suing leaving workers is di¢ cult
3
to establish when wages are secret or workers develop valuable ideas infrequently. We
also analyze the case where reputation for or commitment to wage and suing policies is
feasible.
In the incomplete contracts case, prot sharing inside the rm is not feasible, and
a workers only motivation to exert e¤ort stems from being able to capture a fraction
of the value of the idea if leaving. We nd that a rm more strongly protected by
complementarities pays higher wages, has less turnover, and has less motivated workers.
Stronger complementarities imply that a given idea has a higher value inside the rm,
and the rm decreases turnover by paying more. Paying more implies less motivated
workers, because the entrepreneurial option becomes less attractive relative to staying on
in the rm. The available evidence, discussed in Section 5, gives some support to these
predictions.
A worker that expects the rm to sue has weaker incentives to exert e¤ort, because
the value of the entrepreneurial option decreases. The rms litigation policy therefore
balances the costs of having less motivated workers with the benets of fewer workers
departing. At a casual level, this trade-o¤ accords with the personnel policy at Hewlett-
Packard, which in addition to encouraging workers to start up their own companies had a
reputation for employees being highly motivated. We nd that a rm strongly protected
by formal property rights may not sue leaving workers, in order to induce high e¤ort. In
contrast, we nd that a rm not protected by complementary assets must sue in order
to achieve positive prots, the reason being that not suing will lead to only workers with
low-value ideas stay on in the rm.
1.1 Related literature
A range of evidence supports the idea that knowledge workers leaving pose a threat
to rms. For example, Groysberg et al. (2001) nd that equity analysts, particularly
"stars", quite commonly leave and start up their own companies. Bhide (2000) nds that
71% of entrepreneurs in a sample of fast-growing companies replicated or modied an
idea encountered through previous employment, which echoes earlier ndings by Cooper
(1985) and by Delaney (1993). Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and Møen (2005) nd evidence
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consistent with rms using their wage policy to retain workers.
On litigation of employees, Stone (2002) reports that the number of court cases involv-
ing covenants not to compete and trade secrets has increased sharply in recent decades.
Similar ndings are reported by Lowry (1988). Case evidence suggests heterogeneity in
the litigation policy of R&D-intensive rms. Starting with the famous trade secret case
E.L. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland in 1914, there are many examples of
rms that have sued departing workers. Hewlett-Packard institutionalized a famous pol-
icy where workers were encouraged to leave and start up their own companies, often with
ideas gained from their employment at Hewlett-Packard.3 Similarly, Google is reputed to
be lenient with departing employees. In a much-publicized recent case, workers from the
electronics company Cadence founded a company, Avant!, based on software programs
and customer relations developed at Cadence. Cadence sued the departing workers. Sev-
eral of the workers received nes and prison sentences (Glynn and Mukherjee, 2003) and
were also required to pay a restitution fee. Intel and Microsoft have a reputation for being
uncooperative with leavers, and the same holds for a range of Route 128 companies, as
described by Saxenian (1994).4
There are three branches of the theoretical economics literature that address issues
that are related to the current paper: the management of innovation, the economics of
litigation, and the industrial economics of research and development (R&D). This paper
di¤ers from the existing literature in several important respects.
Pakes and Nitzan (1983) consider a moral hazard problem where rms have no for-
mal property rights protection and workers can appropriate part of their output. Such
appropriation provides workers with an incentive to provide e¤ort. While our model
3The response of Dave Packard, one of the two founders of Hewlett-Packard, was, Are we upset that
they left us? On the contrary, Bill and I understand and respect their entrepreneurial spirit(Packard,
1995).
4Gompers and Lerner (1998) discuss an interesting case of the trade-o¤s involved in deciding whether
to sue leavers or not. Xerox set up a committee among whose duties was to decide upon how to prevent
technology leakage from the rm. "The committee focused on two options: (1) to begin aggressively
litigating those who try to leave with new technologies, and (2) to invest in people trying to leave Xerox.
Variations in employee noncompetition law across states (and particularly the weak level of protection
a¤orded by the California courts) make it unclear how e¤ective a policy of aggressive litigation would be.
Furthermore, such a policy might reduce Xeroxs ability to recruit the best research personnel, who might
not want to limit their future mobility. Based on the committees recommendation, [Xerox] Chairman
Kearns decided to pursue a corporate venture capital program."
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shares this feature of Pakes and Nitzan, their paper does not consider workers having pri-
vate information about output, which drives turnover in our model; nor does it consider
the possibility of rms litigating against departing workers.5 In the incomplete contract
setting of Aghion and Tirole (1994), the problem is how to allocate ownership of innova-
tions to alleviate holdup problems between a research unit and a customer. We consider
incomplete contracts between a worker (innovator) and the rm related to access to rm-
specic complementary assets. Similar to Aghion and Tirole (1994), incomplete contracts
and holdup problems result in ine¢ cient use of complementary assets and prevent use of
prot-sharing contracts between the worker and the rm.
Hellmann (2007) and Subramanian (2005) consider the multitasking problem that en-
sues if a worker can engage in private activitieson the job with the intention of creating
a start-up later. In contrast to these papers, we assume that the main problem from the
rms viewpoint is that workers leave with ideas generated through their legitimate work.
Neither of these papers discusses the rms incentives to litigate against workers. Gam-
bardella and Panico (2008) consider how rms can o¤er a menu of contracts describing
job autonomy, wage, and how worker time is split between innovative and less innovative
activities in order to attract talented workers. In contrast to their paper, which considers
the hiring of workers with unobservable talent, we examine how a rm should motivate
workers to produce new ideas (unobservable worker e¤ort). Both models predict that the
best workers leave in equilibrium.6
In Anton and Yao (1995), a worker discovers an idea privately, and the authors study
when the worker will leave the rm in order to develop the idea (start-up) and when
the worker together with the rm will develop the idea (spin-o¤). A worker leaves if he
would be in a weak bargaining position by staying and sharing the idea with the rm.
5The same holds for Kim and Marschke (2005). Hvide (2009) considers a model where workers have
private information about the value of their ideas but does not consider workersdecisions about how
much of an e¤ort to make, or rmssuing decisions.
6Motta and Rønde (2003) analyze how noncompete clauses inuence the workers provision of inno-
vative e¤ort. They show that a rm might prefer not to include such a covenant in the employment
contract, in order to commit to reward the worker. In contrast to our paper, they do not consider how
the rms behavior might be a¤ected by the strength of property rights protection or by complementary
assets. Lewis and Yao (2003) show that rms may choose an open research arrangement (open interaction
with agents outside the rm) if this helps the rm in attracting workers. They do not consider workers
incentives to exert e¤ort.
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As in our analysis, Anton and Yao (1995) analyze a setting where weak property rights
restrict the rms ability to compensate the worker for ideas, which may lead to start-
up activities. In our model, ex-post holdup problems associated with transfer pricing of
rm-specic complementary assets prevent credible prot-sharing contracts. Furthermore,
Anton and Yao (1995) do not explore the role of complementary assets on the rms wage
and litigation policies.
Anton and Yao (1994, 2002) ask how a privately informed inventor might sell an idea
when formal property rights are nonexistent. Anton and Yao (1994) argue that the threat
of selling o¤ the idea to a competitor may give the inventor bargaining power with an
incumbent rm, and Anton and Yao (2002) argue that the innovator may partially disclose
the idea and can then persuade the rm to pay more.7 We use the insight from Anton
and Yao that an inventor may be reluctant to reveal the content of an idea to motivate
our assumption that workers have private information about their innovations.
The incentives to litigate have been studied by several authors, e.g., Bebchuk (1984)
and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) on pretrial negotiations, and Priest and Klein (1984)
on the probability of succeeding in court. Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) provide a review
of this literature. Regarding empirical evidence, Siegelman and Waldfogel (1996) and
Lanjouw and Lerner (1998) estimate a PriestKlein model on data from litigation cases
and nd that intellectual property rights cases are relatively predictable but also quite
hard to win (about 35% are ruled in favor of the plainti¤ in the former sample).
According to Manseld (1986) and Teece (1986), in many industries, rms regard
complementary assets, rather than intellectual property rights, as their main tool for
protecting their innovations. By refusing access to rm-specic complementary assets, the
rm makes it less tempting to steal intellectual property. This paper is to our knowledge
the rst on how complementary assets a¤ect the management of knowledge workers.
Most of the industrial economics literature on R&D has considered the rm as a unit and
examined how product-market competition and patent policy determine R&D investments
jointly (for a comprehensive overview, see Scotchmer, 2004). While this literature provides
7A related literature considers how to protect innovations from product-market competitors (see e.g.,
Anton and Yao, 2004). The underlying tension is that patents may give stronger formal rights but also
disclose more about the innovation.
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insight into how a rms competitive environment stimulates investments in R&D, it
has not analyzed how successful innovation depends on worker initiative and the rms
personnel policy.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3
establishes the benchmark case with complete contracts on rm-specic complementary
assets. Sections 4 and 5 analyze our main case with incomplete contracts. Section 4
contains the noncommitment analysis, while Section 5 contains the commitment analysis.
The empirical implications of the model are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 examines
the possibility of prot-sharing arrangements with workers and out-of-court settlements.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
The model describes the development of an idea inside the rm by a worker and how the
rm can motivate the worker and at the same time benet from new ideas. There are ve
dates in the model.
Date 1: There is one principal (rm) and one agent (worker). The agent has no
private wealth, and reservation utility U > 0. At date 1, the agent is hired and paid an
initial wage F  0.8 The worker then exerts e¤ort e at a private cost c(e), where c(e)
satises c(0) = c0(0) = 0 and c00(e) > 0.
Date 2: The workers e¤ort produces an idea with stand-alone value x, where x = e+,
and  is a random variable with full support and distribution function G().9 Throughout,
we assume for simplicity that G() is such that the utility and prots functions are concave
globally. The agent learns x, whereas the rm learns x with probability p. In the main
analysis we let p = 0, so that the worker has private information about x. In Section 7.1
we discuss the case where p > 0.
8F = 0 reects the case where the rm pays the worker a low wage in the rst period (although not
a negative wage, which would violate limited liability), but the worker has the chance of discovering a
valuable innovation.
9We assume that ideas with negative values are also implemented. All of our results continue to hold
if we assume that ideas with negative values are scrapped, or that the support of  is positive (so that all
ideas have positive value).
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Access to rm-specic complementary assets increases the idea value from x to x,
where   1. Weak complementarities correspond to  close to 1, and strong complemen-
tarities correspond to  >> 1.
Date 3: The rm o¤ers a continuation wageB to the worker. In Section 4, we consider
the benchmark where the rm can make the continuation wage a function of prots when
rm-specic complementary assets are employed, i.e., contracts are complete. In Sections
5 and 6 we consider the incomplete contracting case, where the rm can only make the
wage depend credibly on prot if complementary assets are not employed.
Date 4: If the wage o¤er is accepted by the worker, the rms payo¤ is x   B and
the workers payo¤ is B. If the contract o¤ered at date 3 is rejected by the worker, he
quits the rm and develops a start-up based on the idea value x. If the worker leaves, the
rm chooses whether to litigate against the worker or not. If the rm does not sue, the
nal payo¤s become 0 to the rm and x to the worker.
Date 5: If the rm sues, the payo¤s depend on the court outcome. Upon reaching the
court, the idea has matured into something more physical(such as technical drawings
or a prototype) that although its value is not veriable the court can transfer from the
worker to the rm. The court rules in favor of either the rm or the worker. If the court
rules in favor of the rm, the rm gets x. The worker gets 0. In contrast, if the court
rules in favor of the worker, the worker keeps the idea and develops it independently of
the rm. The rm then gets 0, and the worker gets x. We assume that the litigation costs
are zero. In Section 7.2 we analyze the implications of positive suing costs.
As evidenced by a large body of legal literature (see Merges, 1999, or Kim and
Marschke, 2005, p. 299, for references) rms and employees cannot contract easily around
the problem of workers leaving with innovations, an important reason being that overly
broad noncompete or "trailer" clauses will be voided by courts. We assume that enforce-
ment by courts is probabilistic, in that the rm wins the litigation trial with probability
 2 [0; 1]. A high  corresponds to the case where the court enforcement is strong. The
idea that court outcomes are probabilistic is common in the theoretical literature (e.g.,
Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989) and has substantial empirical support, see e.g., Lemley and
Shapiro (2005). In the current context, one reason why court outcomes can be modeled
most plausibly as probabilistic is that it can be di¢ cult for courts to establish whether
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the innovation was conceived when the leaver was still an employee (Merges, 1999).10
We think of  as partly being determined by industry characteristics such as di¢ culty in
assessing the nature of early-stage innovations, and partly by legislation and practice.
An overview of the timing appears in Figure 1:
The worker
generates an
idea and
learns its
value.
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2 Date 5
If possible, the
firm commits
to wage and
litigation
policies.
The firm
makes a wage
offer and the
worker accepts
or rejects.
Date 3
A worker is
hired and
chooses a non-
observable
effort level.
If the firm
litigates, the
court makes
a decision.
Date 4
If the worker
leaves, the
firm decides
whether to
sue or not.
Figure 1: Timing
In our main case, analyzed in Section 4, we assume that the rm cannot commit to
litigation and wage policies at date 0. For instance, it might be di¢ cult to establish a
reputation for a wage policy if wage levels are di¢ cult to observe for outside workers, or
it might be di¢ cult to establish a reputation for not litigating against departing workers
if they leave infrequently. Alternatively, the rm could be too young to have established
a reputation.11 To understand the role played by the noncommitment assumption, in
Section 5 we analyze a setting where commitment to wage and suing policies is feasible
at date 0.
The basic trade-o¤s in the main analysis are as follows. The worker chooses an e¤ort
level trading o¤ its private cost against a higher value of the idea if he becomes an
10For example, Merges (1999, p. 49) reports that "... in Koehring Co. v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., an
employee signed a fairly typical agreement requiring him to disclose all improvements, discoveries, and
inventions related to business carried on or contemplated by his employer rm that he developed during
employment. The court, stating that the agreement did not give an employer a mortgage on all thoughts
occurring to the employeeand did not include ideas drawn from the employees general knowledge, ruled
that the employees rough sketches and designs were never developed [during employment] to the extent
that they constituted material subject to the agreement."
11Merges (1999, p. 43) discusses both the veriability problem with early-stage innovations and the
problems a rm might have in building a reputation. See Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for an extensive
analysis of how rms might build a reputation in repeated relationships.
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entrepreneur. The rm sets a wage that trades o¤ the gains from keeping better worker
types (ideas) with the cost of paying more for all staying workers. We focus on perfect
Bayesian equilibria (PBE). A combination of strategies is a PBE if three conditions are
satised: the rm sets its wage and litigation policies optimally given its beliefs about
worker behavior; the worker anticipates the rms behavior and chooses his e¤ort level
and whether or not to leave to maximize his utility; and the rms conjecture about the
workers behavior is fullled.
The model captures in a simple way how rm-specic complementary assets and the
legal institutional framework a¤ect the interaction between knowledge workers and em-
ployers. Several aspects of the legal process are left out of the model. For example,
our model does not take into account that the court may demand that compensation be
paid by the worker to the rm, rather than demanding that the idea be returned to the
rm. Furthermore, in our basic model, the parties have no litigation costs. This last
possibility is discussed in Section 7.2.
3 Benchmark: complete contracts
If the idea is developed inside the rm, rm-specic complementary assets can be em-
ployed. Such assets include patents, co-workers, production equipment, and technology.
In the main analysis, we assume that using such assets increases production e¢ ciency (by
the factor ) but at the same time makes it impossible to write contracts on the marginal
contribution of the worker. To understand the role played by the latter assumption, we
now consider the benchmark case where the use of complementary assets does not prevent
the rm from paying a wage conditional on prot.
The worker stays only if B(x)  (1  )x. If the worker stays, the rms prots equal
(x B). The rm chooses a wage B(x) to maximize prots. We then have the following
result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the worker can be rewarded based on the prot generated
by the idea. Then the rm o¤ers the worker a wage equal to the entrepreneurial option,
(1  )x. There is no turnover, and rm prots are ( +   1)x.
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The optimal contract ensures that the worker stays in the rm and uses the comple-
mentary assets to develop the idea. The worker receives no information rent additional to
the outside value of the idea, and the rm maximizes prot by using rm-specic comple-
mentary assets e¢ ciently. The optimal allocation of payo¤s can be implemented by giving
the worker a xed share in the project outcome. The worker gets a share s of prots,
where s =
(1  )x
x
= (1  ) =. The workers continuation wage is associated positively
with idea quality, and consequently there is prot sharing under complete contracts.12
4 Incomplete contracts
Firm-specic assets do not have a market price, and it is di¢ cult to know in advance which
assets will contribute to the development of the idea. Ex-post negotiation of specialized
assets (such as licensing of patents) blurs the picture of the protability of the idea and
makes it di¢ cult to write contracts based on protability (for a similar idea, see e.g.,
Aghion and Tirole, 1994). For example, in the absence of comparable market prices, the
rm may hold up the worker and tunnel prot out of the unit by charging high transfer
prices for inputs.13 Hence, we assume that it is infeasible to write contracts based on
prot if complementary assets are used and internally priced within the rm. We also
assume that the worker cannot communicate credibly the true value of the idea to the
rm, because a report would be cheap talk and cannot be veried.14 The combination
12If the rm can commit to wage and suing policies, the optimal contract may entail that the rm
o¤ers a larger share than s in order to induce greater e¤ort. It would be particularly important to induce
e¤ort if the outside option is small compared with the inside value of the idea ( close to 1 and  large).
13If the rm is free to charge price p for complementary assets, it can simply charge a su¢ ciently large
price to make the prot of the separate unit, x p, zero. Outsiders can only observe the aggregate x p
and not observe whether low prot is because of a low x or high p. Under complete contracts, the price p
can be decided at date 3 to prevent any subsequent holdup problems and bargaining over transfer prices.
14Anton and Yao (1994, 2002) examine how innovators should strategically reveal veriable information
to extract rent for his innovation. In both papers, the innovator needs either to have wealth (that can be
used to signal credibly the value of the idea) or to benet from having competing buyers of the idea (he
can threaten to sell the idea to a competitor in order to reduce the holdup problem). In our case, the
worker has no wealth to signal idea quality, and the only alternative use of the idea is to develop it on
his/her own (without access to complementary assets). Merges (1999) cites an interesting empirical study
of the commitment problem regarding workers with new ideas. Barry Weinmann and Brian D. Wright
examined 879 idea submissions made to members of the National Association of Suggestion Systems.
The study concludes that the suggestion box systems do elicit extra ideas from employees, but that
compensation for ideas falls below the level that might be expected.
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of incomplete contracts and relationship-specic investments by rms and workers relates
our analysis closely to seminal work by Williamson (1975) and later formal models by
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). The observation made in the
previous section that complete contracts could prevent holdup problems and induce
e¢ cient investments was made previously by Crawford (1988).
We assume that the rm has two options at date 3: the idea can be developed in
a unit with access to rm-specic complementary assets, and the worker is paid a xed
wage; or, alternatively, the worker can develop the idea in a separate unit without access
to complementary assets and be paid according to the prot of the unit (i.e., no transfer
pricing and holdup problems). Proposition 2 shows that the rm will choose the rst
alternative optimally.
Proposition 2 Suppose the rm can o¤er the worker either a xed wage using comple-
mentary assets or a prot-sharing contract not using complementary assets. The rm will
maximize prot by o¤ering a xed-wage contract and letting the worker use complementary
assets.
In light of the contributions of Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1979) it is not
surprising that contracting problems in markets can lead to vertical integration and weaker
incentives. In our model, it is the holdup problem associated with the noncontractibility
of rm-specic complementary assets that makes integration optimal (ideas are developed
inside the rm) and incentives weak.
Proposition 2 simplies the analysis of the incomplete contracts case by letting us
focus on xed-wage contracts. Next, we will examine this case in more detail and focus
on how wages, worker turnover, and litigation policy depend on the rms level of rm-
specic complementary assets. In Section 7.1, we extend the analysis by allowing the rm
to observe the protability of the new idea with some probability, and we show how this
possibility leads to some prot sharing inside the rm.
4.1 Equilibrium
We now solve for the equilibrium when the rm cannot commit to litigation and wage
policies at date 0. To ease the exposition, we assume uniqueness of equilibrium for a given
13
(; ). Proofs appear in Appendix A.
The workers leaving decision: Because  > 0, it will always be optimal for the
rm to sue a leaving worker. Therefore the workers utility is B if staying with the rm
and x(1   ) if leaving. The worker leaves if x exceeds the cuto¤ z, where z = B
(1  ) .
Thus the best ideas tend to leave the rm.
The rms wage o¤er: For a given e, the rms prots equal:
 =
Z z e
 1
((e+ ) B)g()d+
Z 1
z e
(e+ )g()d  F: (1)
The rst term captures the rms gain from keeping the worker and developing the idea
inside the rm. The second term captures the expected prots from suing a leaving
worker. Substituting for B = (1  )z in equation (1) and di¤erentiating with respect to
z, we obtain the rms marginal prots:
z = z(   1)(1  )g(z   e)  (1  )G(z   e): (2)
The rst term reects the increase in prots from keeping higher worker types, and the
second term reects the larger wage bill to worker types that stay. Setting z = 0 denes
implicitly the optimal z, denoted by z, with the second-order condition zz < 0. Because
 occurs only in the rst term of equation (2), it follows that z increases in . Because
(1-) occurs in both terms of equation (2), z is independent of . Thus the e¤ects of a
changed  must occur via the workers rst-order condition.
The workers e¤ort decision: For a given z, the workers expected utility equals:
U = BG (z   e) + (1  )
1Z
z e
(e+ )g()d  c(e): (3)
The rst term represents the workers utility if staying (x  z), and the latter term
represents the workers utility if he leaves (x > z). Substituting for B = (1   )z in
equation (3) and di¤erentiating with respect to e, we obtain the workers marginal utility:
Ue = (1  ) (1 G (z   e))  c0(e): (4)
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The rst term represents the marginal gain from e¤ort while the second term reects the
marginal cost. Because 1 G(z   e) equals the probability that the agent starts up his
own company, we see that the agents motivation to exert e¤ort stems from the possibility
of becoming an entrepreneur. The optimal e¤ort level, denoted by e, is dened implicitly
by Ue = 0. It follows from equation (4) that the worker will be more motivated if property
rights are weak (low ) or if he expects a low wage o¤er (i.e., a low z). Because  does
not occur in equation (4), worker e¤ort does not depend directly on . Thus the e¤ects of
a changed  must come via the rms rst-order condition. Equilibrium is a combination
(e; z) that solves equations (2) and (4) with equality.
Let us summarize the equilibrium with the following remark.
Remark 1 In equilibrium,
(i) e¤ort is lower than in the complete contracts case,
(ii) turnover is positive,
(iii) the best ideas leave the rm.
To illustrate the equilibrium, consider Figure 2, which illustrates the workers best
e¤ort response function e(z) and the rms best response function z(e).
( )ze*
( )ez*
z
e
Figure 2: Equilibrium in the non-commitment case
The workers best response function e(z) slopes downward in (z; e) space, because a
higher expected wage o¤er means that the worker becomes less motivated. The rms
best response function z(e) slopes upward in (z; e) space, because a higher e¤ort means
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that it will become more attractive to keep the marginal worker type.15 The unique
equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two lines. Worker types with ideas whose
value exceeds z leave the rm.
In the following sections, we analyze how the equilibrium is a¤ected by a change in
the level of complementary assets and in the strength of property rights protection.
4.2 Complementary assets
Firms often hold assets that are important for developing new ideas. Potential comple-
mentary assets include existing patents, specialized production capacity, or co-workers
with knowledge important for further development of the idea. In this section, we exam-
ine how these rm-specic complementary assets inuence the rms choice of policies for
retaining and motivating the worker. We dene turnover as the probability of the worker
leaving the rm, i.e., 1 G(z   e).
Proposition 3 More rm-specic complementary assets (higher ) give
i) higher continuation wage,
ii) lower e¤ort, and
iii) lower worker turnover.
Figure 3 illustrates how an increase in the amount of complementary assets changes
the equilibrium outcome.
15Both of these statements follow from di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions implicitly.
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Figure 3: E¤ects of stronger rm-specic complementary assets.
When  increases, the workers best response function e(z) is una¤ected (the value of
the entrepreneurial option is unchanged), whereas the rms best response function z(e)
shifts to the right; for any level of e¤ort, it becomes more benecial for the rm to keep
the marginal worker. Consequently, when  increases, the rm raises its wage o¤er to
keep more worker types. When the wage is raised, the entrepreneurship option becomes
less attractive relative to staying on in the rm, and worker e¤ort decreases. Both these
e¤ects pull in the direction of a reduced turnover rate.
4.3 Intellectual property rights
Merges (1999) and Stone (2002) argue that courtsenforcement of postemployment re-
straints varies from state to state and even from case to case. For example, courts di¤er in
their interpretation of whether negative knowledge qualies as a trade secret (Stone, 2002,
p. 756) or more generally in their emphasis of the protection of rmsR&D investments
versus the protection of free worker mobility and the right to start up a new company.
Alternatively, legal scholars argue that Massachusetts courts are more pro-rmwhile
the California courts are pro-employee when they interpret noncompete clauses and
other features of contract law (see Merges, 1999, and Hellmann, 2007). In this section,
we examine how the strength of intellectual property rights, as captured by , inuences
the rms choice of policies for retaining and motivating workers.
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Proposition 4 Stronger intellectual property rights (increased ) give
i) lower continuation wage,
ii) lower worker e¤ort, and
iii) higher turnover.
The e¤ects from strengthened intellectual property rights are illustrated in Figure 4.
0>Df
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Figure 4: E¤ects from strengthened intellectual property protection.
When  increases, the worker has weaker incentives to exert e¤ort, because the entrepre-
neurial payo¤ is smaller. Hence e(z) shifts downward. An increased  makes it cheaper
for the rm to keep the marginal worker, because the entrepreneurial option has become
less attractive. At the same time, the workers departure becomes less costly to the
rm. These two e¤ects cancel in equilibrium, and the z(e) function stays xed. Because
B = z(1 ), an increase in  leads to a lower wage. There are two e¤ects on the turnover
rate 1 G(z   e). First, z decreases, which in isolation leads to higher turnover. On the
other hand, stronger intellectual property rights decrease e¤ort, which (for a given z)
leads to a lower turnover rate. In the proof of Proposition 4, we show that the second
e¤ect dominates.
Regarding welfare, we argue based on Proposition 4 that e¢ cient intellectual property
rights should balance the benecial ex-ante e¤ects from motivating workers against the
negative ex-post e¤ects on the use of complementary assets. Two features of the e¢ cient
 can be noted. First,  = 1 can never be strictly optimal. The reason is that if  = 1
18
and the rm sues, no worker types will leave, and e¤ort will be zero. When  = 1, the
marginal gain in e¤ort from decreasing  is therefore large while the marginal turnover
cost is small. Second,  = 0 cannot be optimal if  is close to 1. The intuition is that
if  = 0 and  is close to 1, the rms prots must be negative, and the worker would
not be employed in the rst place. The welfare trade-o¤ we identify stands in contrast
with the view put forward by Merges (1999), who argues that strong employer protection
should be implemented to encourage both the rms R&D investments and e¢ cient ex-
post use of innovations. The di¤erence between our analysis and that of Merges (1999)
is that we focus on the harmful ex-ante e¤ects on employee motivation from stronger
(rm) property rights protection. We also note that existing R&D policy literature (see
Scotchmer, 2004) typically argues that intellectual property rights should be strong when
ex-ante e¤ects (on rmsR&D investments) are important relative to ex-post e¤ects (on
the use of innovations). Our analysis complements this literature by suggesting that
intellectual property rights should be weak when the ex-ante e¤ects (on worker initiative)
are relatively important and strong when the ex-post e¤ects (on the use of complementary
assets) are important.
5 Commitment
In this section, we assume that the rm can commit to wage and suing policies at date 0.
Although we cannot characterize the solution as neatly as in the noncommitment case,
we can generate some insights. Below we rst characterize equilibrium and analyze the
optimal suing decision. Then we analyze the comparative statics properties of equilibrium
with respect to changes in  and  and compare this with the results of the noncommitment
analysis.
5.1 Equilibrium and the suing decision
We now solve for the equilibrium when the rm can commit to litigation and wage policies
at date 0. Proofs appear in Appendix B.16
16As the rm can always implement the same level of prots under commitment as under noncommit-
ment, Proposition 2 will still hold, i.e., the rm maximizes prot by o¤ering a xed-wage contract and
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The workers leaving decision: After x has been learned by the worker and the
rm has o¤ered continuation wage B, the workers utility is B if staying, x if leaving and
not being sued by the rm, and x(1  ) if leaving and being sued by the rm. Because
the payo¤ from leaving increases in x (independently of whether the rm sues or not),
the worker leaves if x is su¢ ciently high. A worker who expects not to be sued leaves if
the value of the idea, x, is higher than B. On the other hand, a worker who expects to be
sued leaves only if the value of the idea exceeds B=(1   ). Thus, independently of the
litigation decision, the best ideas tend to leave the rm.
The workers e¤ort decision: Let I be an indicator function that equals 1 if the
rm sues and 0 if not. For given wage and suing policies, the workers expected utility is:
U = BG (z   e) + (1  I)
1Z
z e
(e+ )g()d  c(e): (5)
The rst term represents the workers utility if staying (x  z), and the latter term
represents the workers utility if he leaves (x > z). It is the same expression as in
the noncommitment case, equation (3), except that the suing decision by the rm is
accommodated by the indicator function I. Recall that z = B=(1  I). Substituting for
B in equation (5) and di¤erentiating with respect to z, we obtain:
Ue = (1  I) (1 G (z   e))  c0(e): (6)
The rst term represents the marginal gain from e¤ort, while the second term reects
the marginal cost. Because 1   G(z   e) equals the probability that the worker leaves,
we see that the agents motivation to exert e¤ort, as under noncommitment, stems from
the possibility of becoming an entrepreneur. The optimal e¤ort level, denoted by e, is
dened implicitly by Ue = 0. As under noncommitment, it follows from equation (6) that
the worker will be more motivated if property rights are weak, or if he expects a low wage
o¤er (i.e., ez < 0). It follows directly from equation (6) that,
Remark 2 Holding the wage xed, worker e¤ort is lower if the rm sues than if the rm
lets the worker use the complementary assets.
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does not sue. Holding the suing decision xed, worker e¤ort decreases in the wage o¤er.
( )zeS* ( )zeNS*
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e
Figure 5: E¤ort with and without suing in the commitment case
Figure 5 illustrates the workers optimal e¤ort decision in the commitment case; eS(z)
is the workers best response function if the rm sues and eNS(z) is the workers best
response function if the rm does not sue. Under both suing regimes, a higher wage leads
to a lower worker e¤ort; both eS(z) and eNS(z) are downward sloping. For a given
wage, worker e¤ort is lower if the rm sues; eS(z) lies to the south of eNS(z). The
rms problem in the commitment case is to pick the point on eS(z) and eNS(z) that
maximizes prots.
The rms wage o¤er: The rms prot equals:
 =
Z z e(z)
 1
[(e(z) + )  (1  I)z]g()d+
Z 1
z e(z)
I(e(z) + )g()d  F: (7)
The rst term captures the rms gain from keeping the worker and developing ideas
inside the rm. The second term captures the expected benet from suing leaving worker
types. The rms prot, equation (7), is the same expression as in the noncommitment
case, equation (1), except that e is now a function of z and the rms suing decision is
taken into account by the indicator function I. For the reduced form, we can write prots
as a function (z; e(z)). The rms marginal prots become:
d
dz
= z +eez: (8)
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The rst term is the direct e¤ect of increasing z, which is the same as in the noncom-
mitment case, and the second term accommodates the fact that changing z will reduce
worker e¤ort. At the optimum, the rm sets
d
dz
= 0 for either I = 0 or I = 1.
The second term of equation (8) is negative, and it follows from comparing equation
(8) and equation (2) that the rm o¤ers a lower wage in the commitment case than in the
noncommitment case (conditional on the suing decision being the same in the two cases).
The intuition is that increasing the wage has, relative to the noncommitment analysis,
the additional e¤ect of decreasing e¤ort as depicted in Figure 5.
Recall that in the noncommitment analysis, it is always optimal for the rm to sue a
leaving worker: there are no suing costs, and the rm may win in court. As illustrated
in Figure 5, the commitment case gives the rm a genuine trade-o¤: the suing decision
balances the positive e¤ect of e¤ort against the negative e¤ect of letting more worker
types leave.
Proposition 5 A rm protected strongly by intellectual property rights ( high) may not
sue a leaving worker.
A rm protected strongly by intellectual property rights may increase prots by relin-
quishing its intellectual property rights and committing not to sue a leaving worker. The
key to understanding this result is that a nonlitigation policy improves the workers out-
side options and increases e¤ort. Depending on the level of complementary assets inside
the rm, the gain from increased e¤ort may exceed the negative e¤ect on prots from not
litigating a leaving worker. Given this argument, one interpretation of Hewlett-Packards
personnel policy is that it was well protected by property rights and complementary
assets so well that litigating against leaving workers would seriously damage worker
initiative.
We can also provide a condition under which it will be optimal for the rm to sue.
Proposition 6 A rm not protected by complementary assets (  1) must sue a leaving
worker to obtain positive prots.
If a rm not protected by complementary assets does not sue, only worker types with
x < B will stay on in the rm. This adverse selection problem leads to negative prots;
hence the only way for such a rm to obtain positive prots is to sue a leaving worker.
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5.2 Comparative statics
Let us now discuss the comparative statics results under commitment, and compare them
with the comparative statics results of the noncommitment case. Proposition 3 states
that a rm holding more complementary assets will o¤er a higher wage, the worker exerts
less e¤ort, and turnover is lower. The same result holds under commitment if c(e) is
su¢ ciently convex.
Proposition 7 If c00(e) > [1 c0(e)]=z, then having more complementary assets (higher
) gives
i) higher continuation wage,
ii) lower e¤ort, and
iii) lower worker turnover.
Independently of the rms commitment power, having more complementary assets
makes each worker idea more valuable, which makes it protable to o¤er a higher wage
and reduce worker turnover. However, in the commitment case there is the additional,
opposite, e¤ect: the rm can lower its wage o¤er in order to increase the value of the
entrepreneurial option and thereby increase e¤ort. The more complementary assets, the
more important it is for the rm to stimulate e¤ort, which strengthens the importance
of this e¤ect for the rm. Hence, in isolation this e¤ect means that having more com-
plementary assets leads to a lower wage. In the general case, either of these e¤ects can
dominate. The condition stated in Proposition 7 essentially puts a bound on this e¤ect:
if c(e) is su¢ ciently convex, then the e¤ort decision is su¢ ciently insensitive to incentives
to ensure that Proposition 3 continues to hold in the commitment case.17
The comparative statics results on  yield ambiguous results under commitment. For
example, Proposition 4, part (ii), states that stronger intellectual property rights lead
to lower e¤ort. Just as in the noncommitment case, the direct e¤ect on e¤ort from an
17We have been unable to formulate a condition on the primitives of the model that ensures that
Proposition 3 also holds in the commitment case. To ascertain that the condition in Proposition 7 is
not vacuous, we have veried that it holds in examples. For example, let g() be uniform on [  12 ; 12 ],
c(e) = 1:01e2,  = :2, and  range between 1 and 2.
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increased  is negative, because the entrepreneurial option is less valuable. In the com-
mitment case, there are two indirect e¤ects that make the total e¤ect on e¤ort ambiguous.
First, because the direct gain from litigating has increased for the rm, it may lower its
wage o¤er, let some worker types leave, and then sue them in court. This e¤ect pulls in
the direction of increasing e¤ort. Second, stronger intellectual property rights make the
outside option less attractive to the worker, which makes it less costly to increase the
wage in order keep more ideas (if  is increased, it becomes cheaper to push the threshold
z upward by increasing B, because z = B=(1  I)). This e¤ect pulls in the direction of
lowering e¤ort. Thus, stronger intellectual property rights generate a negative direct e¤ect
on e¤ort and indirect e¤ects via the rms wage setting that go in di¤erent directions,
and the net e¤ect could be either positive or negative.18
6 Empirical implications
Until recently, detailed evidence on the transition from employee to entrepreneur has
been conned to convenient samples and case-level evidence where generalizations are
hard to make (see Merges, 1999, for a discussion of interesting cases). Two new research
projects improve on this situation. First, using a data set that contains information on
about 1.5 million US inventors and their employers, Trajtenberg et al. (2006) develop an
algorithm to trace inventors through time and across employers. Second, Hvide (2009)
uses a large data set from Norway that contains information on both the performance of
entrepreneurial ventures and characteristics of the entrepreneurs previous employers.
A central prediction of our model is that the workers leaving to start up their own
company will be the workers with the best ideas. This prediction nds support both in
Trajtenberg (2006) and in Hvide (2009). Trajtenberg (2006) nds that inventors with
patents that score well on dimensions that are observable ex post but hard to observe
ex ante (such as the patent being useful in a larger number of elds or receiving more
citations) are more likely to move from their employer. Furthermore, Trajtenberg (2006)
nds that employees who leave the rm produce better patents than employees who stay.
18We have generated numerical examples where both e¤ort and turnover are nonmonotonic in .
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These ndings, as pointed out by Trajtenberg, suggest that inventors have better infor-
mation about the expected impact of their intellectual capital than do their employers,
and that the best ideas are more likely to leave. Hvide (2009) nds that entrepreneurs
employed previously by rms that were less likely to have accurate information about
idea quality (where employer size is taken as the main proxy for information accuracy)
perform better as entrepreneurs. The evidence from both Hvide (2009) and Trajtenberg
(2006) is consistent with our model, where asymmetric information about idea quality
leads the workers with the most valuable ideas to leave the rm.
Another main prediction of the model, Proposition 3, says that the wage is higher
and turnover is lower with more complementary assets . The reason is that having more
complementary assets increases the workers value for the rm, which again leads the
rm to increase the wage o¤er. With a higher wage, e¤ort is reduced, because incentives
become weaker. We are not aware of empirical studies that consider this prediction
directly and therefore have to resort to indirect evidence. First, in some cases, we may
associate the amount of complementary assets () with rm characteristics such as size,
leading larger rms to have stronger economies of scope.19 Proposition 3 then suggests
that workers in small rms put in greater e¤ort and create more start-up activities than
do workers in large rms. This is consistent with the empirical regularities that larger
rms have lower turnover (Oi, 1983, Even and MacPherson, 1996) and pay higher wages
(e.g., Fox, 2004). Second, we can view  alternatively as a measure of productivity for a
given rm size. Consistent with Proposition 3, Groysberg et al. (2001) nd that higher-
productivity rms in the equity analyst industry have lower turnover. Regarding wages,
Van Reenen (1996) nds that rms that experience faster technological progress have
higher wage growth.20 Third, mergers and acquisitions, particularly in the technology
19Economies of scope are the purported motive behind many mergers and acquisitions. Such a motive
would generate a positive link between rm size and economies of scope. The extent to which mergers
do in fact create economies of scope (rather than, say, market power) is considered by a large body of
literature, whose ndings are not conclusive. For a recent contribution to this literature, see Gomes and
Livdan (2004).
20One can also relate  to industry maturity. Initially, rms are small, wages are low, and the start-up
activities are plentiful. As the industry matures, concentration increases, and there are more comple-
mentary assets inside the rm, workers get better wage o¤ers inside the rm but are less motivated, and
fewer workers leave to start up their own businesses. This provides a simple argument for why entry
rates are lower in mature industries. We are not aware of direct evidence relating to this question but
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sector, are motivated often by gaining economies of scope. Our prediction would be that
after such mergers, wages should increase and turnover decrease. Conyon et al. (2004)
nd that wages do tend to increase following mergers. Brown and Medo¤ (1987) report
a similar nding. Taken together, these empirical ndings do not provide conclusive
evidence in favor of Proposition 3 but do at least corroborate the hypotheses derived
from it.
Legal scholars argue that legislation on employee inventions varies from state to state
within the US (Merges, 1999). For example, the Massachusetts courts are more pro-rm
while the Californian courts are pro-employee(see Hellmann, 2007, for references) when
they interpret noncompete clauses and other features of contract law. Proposition 4 says
that stronger intellectual property rights lead to lower e¤ort. This result has resonance
in Saxenian (1994), who argues that rms along Route 128 in Massachusetts have fared
worse than their counterparts in Silicon Valley. In addition to geographic variation, the
strength of property rights may vary across time or across industries (Cohen et al., 2000).
For example, up to the 1980s, software innovations were di¢ cult to patent in the US
unless embedded in hardware such as mainframe computers or pizza ovens. Landmark
court decisions in the mid-1990s improved the scope of patenting software dramatically
(Cohen and Lemley, 2001). Such variation in property rights protection across industries
or time may be explored in light of Proposition 4.
7 Extensions
In this section, we discuss two extensions of the basic model that will allows us to analyze
prot sharing and out-of-court settlements. For tractability reasons, we conne ourselves
to considering these two extensions for the noncommitment case.
7.1 Prot sharing inside the rm
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) report that Applied Materials Inc., a California-based pro-
ducer of semiconductor equipment, o¤ered employees who developed new products a per-
note that Long and Link (1983) nd that rms in more-concentrated markets have lower turnover.
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centage of the resulting revenues. The physicist who led the team that developed one
particularly successful product received more than $800,000 in pay which exceeded the
CEOs pay that year. This example illustrates that some rms are able to assess the value
of new ideas and accordingly o¤er compensation. We now extend the model in a simple
way to examine the e¤ects of rms being able to assess the value of new ideas.
Assume that the rm observes with probability p the value of the idea before the
continuation wage contract is o¤ered (after date 2 and before date 3 in Figure 1).21
Furthermore, we assume that the rm needs the worker to explore the idea even in the
case where idea quality is revealed.22 If not, the rm could o¤er a zero continuation wage
and expropriate the idea from the worker.
If the rm observes x, the wage o¤er will be (1  )x, and there will be no turnover,
just as in the complete contracts case (Proposition 1). On the other hand, if the rm does
not observe x, the rms prots equal:Z z e
 1
((e+ ) B)g()d+
Z 1
z e
(e+ )g()d  F: (9)
This is the same expression as in Section 4.1, and hence the optimal z is given by the
solution to equation (2).23 For a given z, worker utility equals:
U = p
Z 1
 1
(1 )(e+)g()d+(1 p)[
Z z e
 1
zg()d+
Z 1
z e
(1 )(e+)g()d] c(e): (10)
The rst term is the wage if the rm learns x, and the second term is the payo¤ if x is
not learned by the rm. For p = 1, equation (10) reduces to the complete contracts case
(Section 3), and for p = 0, equation (10) reduces to the incomplete contracts case (Section
4). The workers marginal utility equals:
Ue = p(1  ) + (1  p)(1  )[1 G (z   e)]  c0(e): (11)
21Note that because the rm has prot-maximizing incentives to adjust the wage o¤er to match the
workers outside opportunity, it su¢ ces that the rm observes the idea value. Outside verication is not
needed.
22As pointed out by Merges (1999), employee innovations are often in an early stage or involve a high
degree of noncodiable know-how held by the specic employee alone.
23Note that the optimal z will not be the same as in Section 4.1, because worker e¤ort is a function of
p.
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The rst term is the marginal gain from e¤ort when x becomes observable, and the
second term is the marginal gain from e¤ort when x does not become observable. The
optimal e¤ort, e, is dened implicitly by setting equation (11) equal to zero. Note that
it follows from equation (11) that, all else being equal, e¤ort increases in p. The following
proposition shows that the e¤ects of comparative statics on  (Proposition 3) and 
(Proposition 4) are the same as in the noncommitment case.
Proposition 8 Suppose 0 < p < 1. Then the following holds:
(i) more rm-specic complementary assets (higher ) give a higher wage, lower e¤ort,
and lower worker turnover, and
(ii) stronger intellectual property rights (increased ) give a lower wage, lower worker
e¤ort, and higher turnover.
The intuition for part (i) is that having more complementary assets does not have a
direct e¤ect on e¤ort, while they give the rm stronger incentives to keep the marginal
worker in the case when x is not observed. (When x is observed, the rms incentives are
not a¤ected.) Thus the rms wage o¤er increases in , and e¤ort decreases, as depicted
in Figure 3. The intuition for part (ii) is that independently of whether x is observed, the
rms wage o¤er decreases in , and hence worker e¤ort decreases.
Regarding the e¤ects of a change in idea observability p, we have the following com-
parative statics result.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the rm observes directly the quality of the idea with prob-
ability p. As p increases,
(i) worker e¤ort increases, and
(ii) turnover decreases.
The possibility of the idea value becoming observable to the rm incentivizes the
worker and triggers higher e¤ort and improved idea quality. Because ideas on average are
better, the rm o¤ers a higher wage also in the case where the idea quality is unobservable
(as shown in Appendix C), which reduces the workers incentives to put in e¤ort. We
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show that this indirect negative e¤ect on e¤ort is smaller than the direct positive e¤ect
from increased p.24
Trajtenberg (2006) nds that inventors with patents that score well on dimensions
that are hard to observe ex ante (such as the patent being useful in a larger number
of elds or receiving more citations) are more likely to leave their employer. Moreover,
employers successfully preempt moves by inventors with patents on ideas that are better
in observable ways. These ndings are consistent with Proposition 9.
The rms ability to monitor the worker and assess the ideas produced may vary with
rm characteristics. Monitoring of workers can be particularly costly when the rm is
larger, more decentralized, there is more noise in the business environment, and the rm
has greater growth opportunities (Core and Guay, 2001, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Jensen
and Meckling, 1992, and Smith and Watts, 1992). On the other hand, transparent and
small rms may be in a better position to assess the quality of new worker ideas. From
this argument, one would expect e¤ort to be higher and turnover to be lower in smaller
rms.25
7.2 Out-of-court settlements
We have assumed that there are no costs associated with bringing a case to court, which
implies that the rm always sues a leaving worker in the noncommitment analysis in
Section 3. Introducing legal costs for the worker does not alter the results of Sections 3
or 4, because the worker would never initiate a court case. Introducing legal costs for the
rm modies the noncommitment analysis of Section 3 in that the rm will not sue the
worker if the expected idea value is low relative to suing costs. Firm suing costs will not
alter the comparative statics results.
Here we introduce rm suing costs and focus on how such costs provide incentives for
24The analysis of prot sharing in the case where the rm commits to wage and suing policies is
analytically complex, and we have been unable to verify whether Proposition 9 holds or not.
In the special case where the agents outside option is constant (i.e.,  = 1) and the rm sues, results
from Poblete & Spulber (2009) apply. They show that if the hazard rate of g() is decreasing, the optimal
wage contract is a call option on output.
25The relationship between rm size and monitoring is unclear and needs to be examined further. For
instance, Friebel & Giannetti (2009) argue that small rms scrutinize new ideas less and acquire less
information about new ideas before they choose to invest.
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the parties to reach an out-of-court agreement through negotiations. Suppose that after
observing the worker leaving, the rm demands compensation L from the worker. If the
demand is accepted by the worker, the rm refrains from suing. If the o¤er is rejected,
the worker and the rm engage in court. We consider again the noncommitment case and
let v be the rms costs associated with suing a leaving worker.26
The equilibrium outcome splits the value of ideas into three intervals. The rst in-
terval consists of worker types with the poorest ideas. These worker types accept the
continuation wage o¤ered and stay inside the rm. The second interval consists of worker
types with ideas of intermediate value. These leavers do not accept paying L and are
litigated against by the rm. The third interval consists of worker types with the best
ideas. These worker types pay L to the rm and are not litigated against.
The rms prot function if the worker has left the rm equals:

1  F

L


L+
L
Z
 1
(x  v) f(x)dx; (12)
where F (:) and f(:) represent the probability and density functions, respectively, of idea
value for a worker that has left the rm. The rst term of equation (12) represents the
prot from out-of-court settlements, while the second term is the expected prot from
suing worker types that reject L. The rm chooses L in equation (12) to maximize prots.
In choosing L, the rm balances the gain from higher compensation from accepting worker
types and the loss because of the lower acceptance rate.
Observe that it follows from equation (12) that more complementary assets make the
rm more inclined to set L high and meet the worker in court. Having more complemen-
tary assets implies that there are larger gains for the rm in trying to win in court and
develop the idea inside the rm. The commitment case is more complex analytically but
preserves the structure in which the equilibrium outcome splits the value of ideas into
three intervals.
26We do not consider the possibility that legal expenses are endogenous and determined by the parties
marginal incentives to inuence the court outcome by investing in legal resources (Cooter & Rubinfeld,
1989).
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Our analysis suggests that larger rms, having more complementary assets, litigate
against leaving workers aggressively and are less willing to settle out of court than are
smaller rms. Lerner (2004) collected data on all litigation cases for a sample of rms from
Middlesex, Massachusetts (the borough in which the hi-tech area Route 128 is located).
Consistent with our analysis, Lerner (2004) nds that larger rms are more involved with
litigation cases involving intellectual property rights than are small rms.27
8 Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical framework to study how rm-specic complementary
assets and intellectual property rights a¤ect the management of knowledge workers. We
have three main ndings. First, rms protected weakly by complementary assets must
sue in order to obtain positive prots. In contrast, rms protected strongly by property
rights may not sue leaving workers in order to motivate e¤ort. Second, rms with more
complementary assets pay higher wages and have lower turnover, but such higher pay
has a detrimental e¤ect on worker initiative. Third, we suggest that the socially optimal
intellectual property rights protection strikes the balance between the e¢ cient use of
complementary assets and worker initiative.
We see three areas of application for our work. First, our ndings on the optimal
litigation policy might be useful for rms deliberating which attitude to take vis-a -vis
departing workers. Our analysis suggests a clear trade-o¤: more litigation gives the rm
a larger piece of the cake if a worker leaves, but also results in less worker initiative and
hence a smaller cake. Second, our results showing that stronger complementarities imply
higher wages, less turnover, and less worker initiative give a set of hypotheses to test for in
personnel data on R&D-intensive rms. These predictions are not obvious; for example,
the e¢ ciency wage theory of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) predicts that higher wages should
lead workers to exert more e¤ort (because of the increased cost of being red). Third, our
results on the e¤ects of property rights legislation may be of interest to policy makers who
27Our analysis suggests that the cases observed in court are intermediate in terms of value, while
the higher-value cases are settled out of court. As Lerners data set does not contain information on
out-of-court settlements, this prediction is not testable in his data.
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aim to understand better the e¤ects of changes in intellectual property rights legislation.
One case that comes to mind is the current discussion in Europe on the appropriate patent
protection for software innovations: we suggest that strengthened protection may reduce
turnover costs but may also decrease the productivity of knowledge-work because of less
motivated workers.
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10 Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions 14
Proof of Proposition 1: We solve the game backwards. The worker leaves if B(x) <
(1   )x. It is therefore optimal for the rm to o¤er either B = 0 or B = (1   )x. An
o¤er B > (1 )x would be wasting prots; an o¤er B such that 0 < B < (1 )x would
be rejected by the worker. If B = 0, the worker leaves, because (1   )x > 0. It will be
optimal for the rm to sue, and expected prots are x. If B = (1   )x, the worker
stays, and prots equal x (1 )x = ( 1+)x. However,  1+ >  because  > 1
and  < 1, and therefore expected prots are higher from o¤ering B = (1 )x than from
o¤ering B = 0. It follows that under complete contracts there will be no turnover and
prots will equal (   1 + )x. Proof of Proposition 2: First consider the case where
the rm invites the worker to develop the idea inside the rm in a separate unit without
access to complementary assets and pays the worker as a function of x. The analysis is
analogous to the complete contracts case: the rm o¤ers the worker a wage equal to the
outside option, i.e., B(x) = (1 )x, the worker stays, and expected prots equal E(x).
Now consider the case where complementary assets are employed, but only a xed-wage
contract is feasible. Suppose that the rm o¤ers B = 0 and sues all leaving worker types.
Expected prots are E [x], which exceeds the prot given that the worker is organized
as a standalone unit, i.e., E [x]. We have thereby shown that the rm prefers to o¤er
a xed-wage contract if contracting on rm-specic complementary assets is infeasible at
date 3.
Proof of Remark 1: Part (i): Under complete contracts, the rst-order condition
of the worker is Ue = (1  )   c0(e) = 0; under incomplete contracts, the rst-order
condition is (1  ) (1 G (z   e))   c0(e) = 0. Because G (z   e) > 0 and c00(e) > 0,
equilibrium e¤ort is lower under incomplete contracts. Parts (ii) and (iii): As shown at
the start of Section 4.1, worker types with x > z leave the rm. That z is nite follows
directly from equation (2).
Proof of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4: For the reduced form, we can suppress
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B and write the two rst-order conditions (2) and (4) as:
z(z; e; ; ) = 0; (13)
Ue(e; z; ) = 0.
The solution to this system denes the equilibrium values of e and z. Dene the turnover
rate as T , where T = 1   G(z   e). We now analyze the e¤ect of a change in  or  on
the equilibrium e, z, and T . Totally di¤erentiate (13) to obtain:
zzdz +zede+zd+zd = 0; (14)
Ueede+ Uezdz + Ued = 0.
Note that it follows from (2) that z = 0 at equilibrium. The solution to (14) becomes:
de
d
=  Uezz=D, dz
d
= zUee=D; (15)
de
d
= zzUe=D,
dz
d
=  zeUe=D;
whereD = zeUez zzUee. Let us evaluate the partials. Di¤erentiating Ue from equation
(4) gives:
Ue =  (1 G(z   e)) < 0; (16)
Uee = (1  )g(z   e)  c00(e) < 0 (second-order condition for optimal e¤ort),
Uez =  (1  )g(z   e) < 0.
Note that Uee =  Uez   c00(e). Now consider the rms partials. Di¤erentiating z from
(2) we have:
zz < 0 (by the rms second-order condition), (17)
ze =  zz + (   1)(1  )g(z   e) > 0;
z = (1  )zg(z   e) > 0:
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It follows from (16) and (17) that D = zeUez   zzUee < 0. Now return to (15). Using
(16) and (17), we can sign the expressions in equation (15) as:
de
d
< 0; ,
dz
d
> 0 (18)
de
d
< 0:,
dz
d
< 0:
That proves Proposition 3, parts (i) and (ii), and Proposition 4, parts (i) and
(ii). We now prove Proposition 3, part (iii), and Proposition 4, part (iii). Recall that
T = (1 G(z   e)). Therefore:
dT
d
= g(z   e)(de
d
  dz
d
). (19)
Substitute (15) into (19) using Uee =  Uez   c00(e) to obtain:
dT
d
= ( Uezz   zUee)=D (20)
=  z(Uee + Uez)=D < 0.
That proves Proposition 3, part (iii). Moving to the e¤ect of a changed  we have:
dT
d
= g(z   e)( de
d
  dz
d
) (21)
= g(z   e)(zzUe   zeUe)=D
= g(z   e)Ue(zz +ze)=D
= g(z   e)Ue(   1)(1  )g(z   e)=D > 0:
That proves Proposition 4, part (iii).
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11 Appendix B. Proofs for the commitment case
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 5, Proposition 6, and Proposition 7. Proof of
Proposition 5: We show that if the rm does not sue and  = 1, the rms prots are
negative. First, note that if the rm does not sue, then z = B. For  = 1, the prots
therefore equal
R B e
 1 (e+  B)g()d. This expression is negative, because e+  B < 0
for any  < B   e. By continuity, the rms prots are also negative for  close to 1.
Proof of Proposition 6: It su¢ ces to construct an example where suing leads to less
prot than does not suing. Let g() be distributed uniformly on [ 1
2
; 1
2
] and let c(e) = 
2
e2,
where  > 0. Expected utility equals:
U =
Z B
1  e
  1
2
Bg()d+
Z 1
2
B
1  e
(1  ) (+ e) g()d  c(e): (22)
By di¤erentiating with respect to e and solving, we have the unique interior solution:
e(B) =
1
s

B +
1
2
  1
2

; (23)
where s = 1    , and s < 0 by the workers second-order condition. Expected prots
equal:
 =
Z B
1  e(B)
  1
2
( (e(B) + ) B)g()d+
Z 1
2
B
1  e(B)
 (e(B) + ) g()d: (24)
The rm maximizes  with respect to B, taking into account the negative impact of B on
e. Di¤erentiating (24) with respect to B and solving, we have the unique interior solution:
B = (1  )
 
   3   4  2 + 2+ 3+ + 2 + 22 + 2
2 (   2   2  2 + 2+ 2) : (25)
From the rms second-order condition, the denominator is negative. To ensure that
B  0, we require the numerator of (25) to be negative. By substituting e from (23)
and B from (25) into the prot function (24), we obtain:
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 = (1 )
2 (4   2   4) + 2 (2   4  2  4 + 4) + 4 + 8  4  2   42   4
8 (   2   2  2 + 2+ 2) :
(26)
Observe that if  = 1, suing yields prots equal to zero while not suing (identical to
 = 0) yields prots equal to:
(   2)2 (   1)2
8 (2 + 2      2) : (27)
This expression is positive if the second-order condition of the rms prot maximization
problem holds. Hence for  = 1, the prots are greater if the rm does not sue than if
it sues. That completes the proof. Note that by the continuity of  from equation (26),
there exists a constant k > 0 such that the prots from not suing are larger than the
prots from suing for  2 (k; 1].
Proof of Proposition 7: We start out by proving (i) and (ii). For part (i), note
that
dz
d
> 0 implies
dB
d
> 0, because B = z(1   I). For part (ii), note that  does
not enter (6), which implies that ez = 0. Therefore the e¤ects on e from a change in 
must operate via z, and to show that
de
d
> 0, it is su¢ cient and necessary to show that
dz
d
< 0. Hence to prove part (i) and part (ii) of Proposition 7 we need to show that
c00(e) > [1   c0(e)]=z implies dz

d
> 0. By using the implicit function theorem on (8),
we have that:
dz
d
=   d
2
dzd
=
d2
dz2
. (28)
The denominator is always negative by the second-order condition of the rms maximiza-
tion problem. To evaluate the numerator,
d2
dzd
, we can di¤erentiate (8) with respect to
 to obtain (we drop the * notation):
d2
dzd
= z(1  I)g(z   e)  [z(1  I)g(z   e)  (1  I)G(z   e)  I] ez. (29)
Because
de
dz
=
(1  I) g(z   e)
(1  I) g(z   e)  c00 (e) from the workers rst order condition (6), this
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expression simplies to:
d2
dzd
= z(1  I)g(z   e) (30)
+ [ z(1  I)g(z   e) +G(z   e) (1  I) + I] (1  I) g(z   e)
(1  I) g(z   e)  c00 (e)
=
(1  I) g(z   e) [ zc00 (e) +G(z   e) (1  I) + I]
(1  I) g(z   e)  c00 (e) .
The denominator is negative by the workers second-order condition, and therefore sgn

d2S
dzd

=
 sgn[ zc00 (e)+G(z  e) (1  I)+ I]. Because G(z  e) (1  I)+ I = 1  c0(e) from
the workers rst-order condition, we can conclude that the following condition ensures
that
dz
d
> 0:
c00(e) > [1  c0(e)]=z: (31)
Hence
dz
d
> 0 if (31) holds. That proves part (i) and part (ii). To prove (iii), recall that
T = 1 G(z e). Because dz
d
> 0 and
de
d
< 0 if (31) holds, part (iii) follows immediately.
12 Appendix C: Prot sharing
Proof of Proposition 8:
In the case where the rm observes x, the rms wage o¤er equals (1  )x and there
is no turnover. In the case where the rm does not observe x, the equilibrium can be
expressed in reduced form as:
z(z; e; ) = 0; (32)
Ue(e; z; ; p) = 0.
The solution to this system gives the equilibrium values of z and e. Note that, as in the
noncommitment case, z(z; e; ) does not depend upon , and Ue does not depend upon
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. Totally di¤erentiating the system (32) gives:
zzdz +zede+zd+zd = 0; (33)
Ueede+ Uezdz + Ued = 0.
In reduced form, this is the same system of equations as in the noncommitment case.
The proof of Proposition 8, part (i), follows from the same procedure as the proof of
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, and is omitted. Let us sketch the proof of Proposition 8,
part (ii). First note that if x is not observed by the rm, a change in  will not a¤ect the
rms wage o¤er; the only e¤ect will be to lower worker e¤ort, as in the noncommitment
analysis of Section 3. If, on the other hand, x is observed, a higher  implies that the
rm will lower the wage o¤er. Both the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect (on the rms
expected wage o¤er) of an increased  will reduce worker e¤ort. That worker turnover
decreases in  follows from the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 9:
We start out by proving part (i). First note that in the case where the rm observes
x, the wage o¤er will not depend on p. In the case where the rm does not observe x, the
equilibrium e and z are given by (2) and (11). We can write the equilibrium in reduced
form as:
z(z; e) = 0; (34)
Ue(e; z; p) = 0.
Totally di¤erentiate (34) to obtain:
zzdz +zede = 0; (35)
Ueede+ Uezdz + Uepdp = 0.
Solving (35), we obtain:
de
dp
= Uepzz=D; (36)
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where D = zeUez   zzUee. Let us now evaluate the partials. Di¤erentiate Ue from
equation (11) to obtain:
Uep = (1  )G(z   e) > 0; (37)
Uee = (1  p)(1  )g(z   e)  c00(e) < 0 (second-order condition for optimal e¤ort),
Uez =  (1  p)(1  )g(z   e) < 0.
Note that Uee =  Uez   c00(e). The partials for the rm when it does not observe x are
given by (17), i.e.,
zz < 0 (by the rms second-order condition), (38)
ze =  zz + (   1)(1  )g(z   e) > 0:
Hence D < 0 and
de
dp
> 0.
We now prove part (ii) for turnover. When x is observed the turnover is zero, and
when x is not observed the turnover is 1 G(z   e). Hence expected turnover equals:
T = (1  p)(1 G(z   e)): (39)
Di¤erentiating with respect to p we obtain:
dT
dp
=  (1 G(z   e)) + (1  p)(de
dp
  dz
dp
): (40)
The rst term is negative. To evaluate the second term, we need to evaluate
de
dp
  dz
dp
.
Solving (35) we nd that
dz
dp
=  Uepze=D > 0. Therefore:
de
dp
  dz
dp
= Uepzz=D + Uepze=D (41)
= [zz +ze]Uep=D
= [(   1)(1  )g(z   e)]Uep=D < 0:
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It follows immediately from (40) that
dT
dp
< 0. Finally note that
dz
dp
> 0 implies that
dB
dp
> 0, because B = z(1  ).
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